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The Right of Publicity: "You Can't
Take it With You"
The "right of publicity," a progeny of.the right to privacy, has evolved into
a valuable property right of the rich and famous. However, indecisive courts
and disinterested legislatures have failed to arrive at any consensus on
whether the "right of publicity" should be descendible and inheritable upon
its owner's death. This comment seeks to evaluate the sundry arguments and
policies concerning this issue, and to advocate a freely descendible 'right of
publicity."
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of modern technology in the mass media has spawned
the growth of a relatively new right of the famous which has come to
be known as "the right of publicity."1 It is defined as the right of
one
2 to prevent the commercial exploitation of his name, likeness, or
picture, and is designed to protect against the unauthorized appropri-
ation of these characteristics by others for commercial gain.3 Unlike
its parent, the right to privacy, this right is invoked to reap the mone-
tary benefits of the publicity the celebrity has been deprived of, and
1. The term "right of publicity" became popularized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
The court stated:
We think that, in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy ... a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph ... i.e., without an
accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common knowl-
edge that many -prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far
from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses,
would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways.
Id. at 868.
2. This comment will not concern those of lesser notoriety who might suddenly
be cast into the limelight by death, disaster, or crime. The "right of publicity" has
evolved into a true right of the famous.
3. The right has been defined in various ways. In Lerman v. Chuckleberry Pub-
lishing Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court stated that "[t]he right of
publicity comprises a person's right to own, protect and commercially exploit his own
name, likeness and persona." It was defined in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981), as "the right of an individual, especially a public figure
or a celebrity, to control the commercial value and exploitation of his name and pic-
ture or likeness and to prevent others from unfairly appropriating this value for their
commercial benefit."
to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant. 4
The primary controversy concerning the "right of publicity," which
continues to loom over the judicial and legislative forums of this
country, is whether the right should be able to survive and descend
upon the death of its owner. The judiciary has consistently been un-
able to agree upon the question, 5 and the legislatures have taken an
almost laissez faire attitude toward the dispute.6 The purpose of this
comment is to explore the judicial, legislative and theoretical treat-
ment the "right of publicity" has received, and to advocate the posi-
tion that the "right of publicity" should be a freely survivable and
descendible right.
Initially, the right to privacy will be discussed. The "right of pub-
licity" will then be examined, including its property considerations,
its application to commercial exploitation of celebrities today, and
whether the right is freely assignable. Finally, both sides of the
descendibility issue will be fully discussed, and a proposed model
statute for a descendible "right of publicity" introduced.
II. EARLY BEGINNINGS IN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy owes its origin to the influential article, "The
Right to Privacy," authored by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 7
4. See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1588-89 (1979). "Many of the individuals involved are
professional performers of one sort or another, such as actors or athletes; their com-
plaint is not ,that they have received publicity, but that they have failed to receive its
benefits." Id. at 1588.
5. The following decisions hold the "right of publicity" terminates at one's death:
Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (Marx Broth-
ers); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980) (Elvis Presley); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d
860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (Rudolph Valentino); Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (Bela Lugosi).
However, the following decisions recognize a survivable "right of publicity": Acme
Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983) (Clyde Beatty);
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (Martin Luther King); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F.
Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis Presley); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F.
Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Elvis Presley); and Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy).
6. Only seven state legislatures currently have statutes that in effect allow for an
appropriation action by a deceased's surviving relatives. These include the following:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1972); KY.
REV. STAT. § 391.170 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§§ 839.1-839.2 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103, 47-25-1104 (1984); VA. CODE
§§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216.1(1982). See infra notes 203-16 and accompanying text.
7. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
This seminal article was supposedly inspired by attacks upon Samuel Warren and his
wife by yellow journalists of the day. The authors stated that "[g]ossip is no longer the
resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery." Id. at 196.
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The article equated privacy with "the right to be let alone," and em-
phasized the "intangible" property rights all of us have in our lives.
8
Warren and Brandeis could not have anticipated the arrival of film,
radio, or television, nor the huge impact it would have upon "the
right to privacy." Although judicial affirmation of Warren and Bran-
deis' tort was slow,9 the Georgia Supreme Court became the first to
recognize "the right to privacy" in Pavesich v. New England Life In-
surance Co.10
Early case law began to distinguish a mini-tort in the right to pri-
vacy,'X which would later be designated "misappropriation"12 by
Dean Prosser.13 Inconsistent judicial decisions led to confusion con-
cerning this new tort action.14 The two cases of O'Brien v. Pabst Sales
Co.15 and Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co.16 illustrate the indecisiveness
which surrounded misappropriation just a few years ago. In O'Brien,
8. Id. at 193. "[N]ow the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-
the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil priv-
ileges; and the term 'property' has grown to comprise every form of possession-intan-
gible, as well as tangible." Id.
9. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), the
New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize a common law right to privacy.
10. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
11. In the case of Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392
(N.J. Ch. 1907), the famous inventor, Thomas Edison, was successful in enjoining the
use of his name and likeness to advertise and promote a medicinal remedy.
A minor recovered damages in Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076
(1911), for publication of his picture in a jeweler's advertisement.
Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), was one of the first
cases to recognize a celebrity'A endorsement as a marketable commodity and, there-
fore, assignable and enforceable by implied contract.
12. For a general discussion of commercial appropriation, see Treece, Commercial
Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 TEx. L. REV. 637 (1973).
13. Dean Prosser created four separate actions out of the right to privacy which
included the following: (1) intrusion upon solitude; (2) public disclosure of private
facts; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) misappropriation of name or likeness. W.
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849-68 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Ironically, early decisions seemed to deny relief to personalities because they
were public figures who had intentionally subjected themselves to publicity. In Gau-
tier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952), the plaintiff, an animal
trainer, was denied relief when his act during a televised football game was aired in
violation of a contract. Similarly, in Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1940), the plaintiff, who at an early age was recognized as a genius, unsuccessfully
challenged an account concerning his life in New Yorker magazine.
Yet some decisions reflected the rationale of modern, commercial exploitation cases.
This was best displayed in Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios Co., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127
P.2d 577 (1942), which allowed an actress to recover for the use of her name in a sug-
gestive letter that had advertised a movie.
15. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942).
16. 202 Misc. 900, 118 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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a well-known football player was denied relief when a beer company
had displayed his picture on a calendar advertising its beer.17 In Jan-
sen, however, professional baseball players had a cause of action
when their likenesses were used on popcorn and chewing gum con-
tainers.' 8 The ambiguities associated with this common law right to
privacy action19 would soon be clarified by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. 20
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE "RIGHT OF PUBLICITY"
Asserting the "right of publicity" as the progeny of the right to pri-
vacy has been termed "a misuse of language and law."21 These two
legal doctrines are inherently different: the right to privacy seeks to
redress mental suffering and humiliation, and the "right of publicity"
endeavors to reimburse financial loss caused by an unauthorized
appropriation. 22
The realization of a separate cause of action and the recognition of
a distinct "right of publicity" arose in the decision of Haelan Labora-
tories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.23 The plaintiff, an exclusive
contractual assignee of a ballplayer's photograph for usage in chew-
ing gum sales, was allowed recovery from the defendant chewing
gum manufacturer, who had subsequently contracted with the same
player and used his likeness in advertising. 24 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned "a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph ... [and] his right might be called a 'right of pub-
licity.' "25 The court perceptively recognized that property considera-
tions were at the heart of the doctrine of publicity. "Whether it be
17. The court in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. denied relief based on the presumption
the plaintiff had voluntarily subjected himself to publicity. O'Brien, 124 F.2d at 170.
18. Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., 202 Misc. at 901, 118 N.Y.S.2d at 163-64.
19. A common law cause of action can be established for appropriation by effec-
tively pleading "(1) the defendant's use of plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of
plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3)
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 117, at 856-59 (5th ed. 1984).
20. In the decision of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), the "right of publicity" was
recognized.
21. Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1588-89 (1979).
22. Chief Justice Bird, dissenting in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813,
835-36, 603 P.2d 425, 438-39, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 336-37 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), ex-
pounded on this inconsistency between privacy and publicity. "[T]he gravamen of the
harm flowing from an unauthorized commercial use of a prominent individual's like-
ness in most cases is the loss of potential financial gain, not mental anguish." Id
23. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
24. Id.
25. Id. The court went on to say celebrities "would feel sorely deprived if they no
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their counte-
nances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways." Id.
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labelled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere,
the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth."26 Thus, the "right of publicity"
became a recognized legal cause of action that would begin to shelter
the affluent and famous from proliferation in the mass media.
The "right of publicity" had evolved from a tort which stressed the
protection of one's feelings and privacy into one that was to prevent
"unjust enrichment."27 Within a few years of the Haelan28 decision,
courts began to consistently acknowledge a right to protect one's like-
ness, name, and persona.29 Acceptance of the "right of publicity"
came quickly. However, many questions concerning this new action
remained unanswered. What must be proven to constitute a cause of
action? Who may assert and enforce the "right of publicity?" What
personal characteristics are protected?
A test for a cause of action under the "right of publicity" was laid
down in Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.30 by Judge
Werker:
An individual claiming a violation of his right of publicity must show: (1) that
his name or likeness has publicity value; (2) that he himself has "exploited"
his name or likeness by acting "in such a way as to evidence his... own rec-
ognition of the extrinsic commercial value of his . . .name or likeness, and
manifested that recognition in some overt manner . . ." (citations omitted);
and (3) that defendant has appropriated this right of publicity, without con-
sent, for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.3 1
This test emphasizes that the plaintiff should in fact be a personality
who has already "exploited" his likeness. Therefore the test differs
26. Id.
27. The United States Supreme. Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), stated that "[t]he rationale for [protecting the right of public-
ity] is the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good
will." Id. at 576.
28. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
29. In Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), a
federal court of appeals awarded damages to an ex-prizefighter when an unauthorized
telecast of one of his early fights was aired.
Similarly, in Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (1957), Ben Hogan, the
professional golfer, was allowed relief for loss of "good will" and "commercial value"
in his name when a golf instruction book had used his photograph.
California also recognized the pecuniary value of one's name and likeness in Fair-
field v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955), where
an attorney recovered damages for use of his name in a photocopier advertisement.
30. 521 F. Supp. 228, 232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The plaintiff, Jackie Collins Lerman,
successfully recovered for loss of right of publicity for usage of her name in connection
with a nude photogragh in defendant's Adelina magazine.
31. Id.
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from a mere "misappropriation" action,3 2 and thus begs the question,
who can assert the "right of publicity?"
Theoretically, everyone should be able to exercise a "right of pub-
licity"; but some authorities 33 suggest it is a right only assertable by a
"celebrity." 34 The most logical solution is to grant everyone the
"right of publicity," even though it may be of inappreciable value,
and allow the amount of damages to reflect the relative worth of
one's right.3 5 Bear in mind, however, that people would have little
anxiety over the violation of their "right of publicity" unless they
have achieved some level of fame themselves.
The protection granted under the "right of publicity" has expanded
to encompass one's name,3 6 picture,3 7 likeness,3 8 identity,3 9 prop-
32. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, supra note 19.
33. Professor Nimmer stated that "the right of publicity should be limited to those
persons having achieved the status of a 'celebrity,' as it is only such persons who pos-
sess publicity values which require protection from appropriation." However, he went
on to say, "the right of publicity accorded to each individual 'may have much or little,
or only a nominal value,' but the right should be available to everyone." Nimmer, The
Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 217 (1954).
One author stated the problem in this manner: "It is unclear whether the right at-
taches only to celebrities, or whether everyone, at least theoretically, has a right of
publicity." Comment, The Right of Publicity Revisited Reconciling Fame, Fortune,
and Constitutional Rights, 62 B.U.L. REV. 965, 970 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
34. Dean Prosser states that "[a] public figure has been defined as a person who,
by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession ... has
become a 'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity." W. PROSSER, PROSSER
ON TORTS § 112, at 844 (3d ed. 1964).
35. One author argues "[a]lthough the celebrity status of an individual should be
relevant to the assertion of a right of publicity, the relative fame of an individual can
affect the amount of damages awarded .... Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning
For The Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D. L. REv. 191, 203 (1983). She goes on to argue
these damages should comprise "not only the measure of the defendant's profits to
which the plaintiff is entitled, but also an amount representing the fair market value
of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Id.
36. Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
37. Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981). Use of fa-
mous model's picture for a poster without consent was held to be in violation of New
York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. This statute was one of the first of its kind
to allow for a statutory action for misappropriation. It provides in part:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his
or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 1976).
38. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The famous fighter was
granted injunctive relief for the use of his image in a cartoon in defendant's magazine,
since damages were difficult to ascertain.
39. "Identity" here refers to one's entire persona. In other words, a defendant has
used a look-alike to imitate a particular celebrity's "identity" to create the illusion, al-
beit fraudulently, that the real celebrity is advertising its product.
This appropriation was recently acknowledged in Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (Sup. Ct. 1984), where a look-
alike was used by the defendant to imitate Jackie Onassis in order to promote a beauty
product. The court held that when an imitator is used in "such a way as to be decep-
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erty,40 group image,4 ' act,42 and even extended to cases where one's
name or likeness was not used.4 3 Illustrative of the modern protec-
tions celebrities enjoy under the right is Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.4 4 Here
the famous prizefighter, Muhammad Ali, was depicted nude in a car-
toon in defendant Playgirl magazine. 45 The court found it probable
that Ali's "right of publicity" was infringed and granted him prelimi-
nary injunctive relief under the New York Civil Rights Statute.46
The court also remarked that "[t]he distinctive aspect of the common
law right of publicity is that it recognizes the commercial value of the
picture or representation of a prominent person or performer, and
protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his public rep-
utation or 'persona.' "47
Recent decisions have even stretched privacy beyond its limits into
tive or promote confusion, that use can be enjoined." Id at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
The court stated that the New York Civil Rights Law was, by its terms, "to protect the
essence of the person .... " Id. at 610, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
This concept has even been extended to entertainers who imitate deceased celebri-
ties. In Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981), an Elvis Presley
impersonator was enjoined from conducting any further concerts. The court reasoned
that when the impersonation lacked informational and entertainment value, and was
primarily for commercial exploitation, the first amendment freedom of speech protec-
tion was no longer a valid defense. Id at 1356. See also Felcher & Rubin, supra note
21, at 1596-99.
40. In Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974),
the court held a famous race car driver was "identifiable" when defendant tobacco
company used a photograph of his car in its advertisement. Id at 826-27.
41. A musical group has been held to be able to develop a "persona" which should
be entitled to a "right of publicity." Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F.
Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp.
1201, 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
42. In Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held a tele-
vision broadcast of plaintiff's entire "human cannonball act" was not protected by the
first and fourteenth amendments. The Court stated:
Thus, in this case, Ohio has recognized what may be the strongest case for a
"right of publicity"- involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer's rep-
utation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appro-
priation of the very activity [his act] by which the entertainer acquired his
reputation in the first place.
Id at 576.
43. In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir.
1983), Johnny Carson was allowed recovery even though there was no appropriation of
his surname or likeness. See also Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280
N.W.2d 129 (1979).
44. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
45. Id. at 725.
46. Id. at 726; N.Y. Civ. RIGHm LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). See supra note 37
for text of section 50.
47. 447 F. Supp. at 728. The violation of one's "right of publicity" was analogized
to unjust enrichment, which results from the theft of goodwill. Id. at 728-29.
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libel and slander. In Eastwood v. Superior Court,48 movie personality
Clint Eastwood challenged a National Enquirer article which alleged
he was in a "love triangle" with Sandra Locke and Tanya Tucker.49
The court held that the intentional falsification of the account could
be in actuality a ploy to appropriate Eastwood's name and likeness
for commercial exploitation of their newspaper. 50 Thus, the limits of
the "right of publicity's" coverage continues to swell to conceivably
infinite situations.
The inconsistency which plagued the early misappropriation cases
has disappeared,51 and, in the absence of some type of waiver,52 ce-
lebrities today enjoy a relatively stable "right of publicity." Yet
problems still plague this new right, such as whether the right should
be freely assignable and even descendible to one's legatees.
Assignability is the sine qua non for a descendible "right of public-
ity." The "right of publicity," unlike its parent, the right to privacy,
is a "proprietary" interest in the commercial worth of one's name
and likeness. Therefore, it is not a personal right but a property
right assignable to another.53 The recognition of this right as a prop-
48. 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
49. Id. at 414, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 345. Although the court held the story to be nonde-
famatory, the question presented was whether the article, presented as true, should be
actionable under Eastwood's "right of publicity" because of its inherent falsity. Id at
413, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
50. Id. at 426, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352. The court stated that "the deliberate fictional-
ization of Eastwood's personality constitutes commercial exploitation, and becomes ac-
tionable when it is presented to the reader as if true with the requisite scienter." Id,
51. All of the following cases are examples of successful "right of publicity" suits
by the famous: Clark v. Celebrity Publishing, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(Lynda Clark recovered punitive damages for publication of photos in pornographic
magazine); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (baseball play-
ers able to enjoin game manufacturer); Bell v. Birmingham Broadcasting Co., 266 Ala.
266, 96 So. 2d 263 (1957) (football announcer recovered for use of name by station to
secure advertising contracts); Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 151,
238 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1963) (actress Carol Lynley recovered for use of name and likeness
in camera manual); Rosenberg v. Lee's Carpet & Furniture Warehouse Outlet, Inc., 80
Misc. 2d 479, 363 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1974) (usage of television personality's name and pic-
ture to advertise furniture store held actionable).
52. Consent to an invasion is a complete defense to appropriation. Sharman v. C.
Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401, 406-07 (E.D. Pa. 1963). However, merely being
a public figure does not constitute a waiver of one's "right of publicity." Nimmer,
supra note 33, at 216. But, where a personality has failed to object to an earlier use of
his name or likeness, a waiver may occur. See Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co., 11
N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962) (memorandum decision); Namath v.
Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975).
53. See Bi-Rite Enters., Inc., v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199-1200
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Restatement of Torts recognizes assignability of the right:
Although the protection of his personal feelings against mental distress is an
important factor leading to a recognition of the rule, the right created by it is
in the nature of a property right, for the exercise of which an exclusive li-
cense may be given to a third person, which will entitle the licensee to main-
tain an action to protect it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment a (1977).
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erty interestM distinguishes it from a nontransferable right to pri-
vacy.5 5 When one comes to the realization that the "right of
publicity" is assignable inter vivos, 5 6 then the theoretical step to ac-
knowledging a descendible and survivable right can easily be made. 7
IV. A SURVIVABLE AND DESCENDIBLE "RIGHT OF PUBLICITY?"
A judicial division of authority has occurred over the question of
whether one's "right of publicity" should be survivable and thus de-
scendible to one's heirs.58 Initially, the arguments against the
descendibility of the right will be discussed. Secondly, an analysis of
the policy and decisions favoring a descendible "right of publicity"
will be examined. The final discussion considers the limitations on a
54. Professor Nimmer states that "[t]he right of publicity must be recognized as a
property (not a personal) right, and as such capable of assignment and subsequent en-
forcement by the assignee." Nimmer, supra note 33, at 216.
55. The right to privacy is not an assignable right, because of its inherent nature
in protecting one's feelings and privacy. See Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
56. One of the earliest cases to recognize that one's reputation or endorsement is
assignable was the implied contract case of Wood v. Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88,
118 N.E. 214 (1917).
Today the courts have consistently allowed for an assignable "right of publicity."
The following decisions all recognized an inter vivos assignment of some aspect of
one's "right of publicity": Cepeda v. Swift and Co., 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969) (base-
ball player assigned right); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (musical groups assigned rights to retailer); Estate of Presley v. Russen,
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis Presley's right held assignable inter vivos and
descendible); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Urban Sys. Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d
144 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Howard Hughes' assignee enforced his right).
57. See Hoffman, The Right of Publicity - Heir's Right, Advertiser's Windfall, or
Courts'Nightmare?, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 1, 26 (1981). The author argues "[t]he reasons
that permit inter vivos transfer of publicity rights may, however, also enable courts to
logically substantiate the survival and descent of publicity rights at the time of the ce-
lebrity's death." Id.
58. Lack of statutory guidance in most states has left federal and state courts in a
theoretical battle over whether the right is descendible. All of the following decisions
have held that the right is neither survivable nor descendible: Groucho Marx Prods. v.
Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982); Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc.,
Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979); Lugosi v. Uni-
versal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). However, the
following decisions acknowledge a descendible "right of publicity": Acme Circus Oper-
ating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513
F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); and
Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
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descendible "right of publicity"; these include the exploitation re-
quirement, durational limits, and first amendment concerns.
A. A Personal "Right of Publicity?"
At the very heart of the argument against descendibility of the
"right of publicity" is the legal principle that the right to privacy is a
personal right, and as such, cannot be assigned or inherited.59 Since
the right to privacy is a purely personal one,6 0 the analogy is made
that the "right of publicity" derived from this right is personal as
well, and thus nonassignable and noninheritable.61 However, the
analogy fails when one recognizes that the "right of publicity" is not
personal 62 and is freely assignable.63
Several other policy arguments can be asserted against the
descendibility of the "right of publicity." A descendible right will ef-
fectively stagnate the free dissemination of information and ideas in
violation of the first amendment.6 4 The creation of the "right of pub-
licity" requires a "wide public participation in its creation," therefore,
it should belong to the public domain at a celebrity's death.6 5 Finally,
the inherent difficulties associated with a descendible right, such as
whether there should be an exploitation requirement and how long
the right should be enforceable, would more likely create confusion
than solve problems.
The judiciary has been quite sluggish in acknowledging a surviv-
able and descendible "right of publicity."6 6 Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
59. See Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1965) (right of
privacy does not survive one's death); Corliss v. E.W. Walker, 57 F. 434 (D. Mass. 1893)
(privacy a personal right and not relational); Abernathy v. Thorton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So.
2d 235 (1955) (privacy does not survive to relatives); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42
N.E. 22 (1895) (one of first cases to recognize the principle).
60. Since a right is personal it is said to be assertable only by its owner; therefore
any attempts at assignment or bequest of that right are invalid. See Hendrickson v.
California Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62, 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (1975).
61. "[Ihe right of publicity as a derivative of the right of privacy can reasonably
determine that the right of publicity, like its progenitor, is not descendible." Reeves v.
United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
62. The Restatement of Torts states that "[e]xcept for the appropriation of one's
name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living
individual whose privacy is invaded." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1977).
63. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
64. See inkfra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
65. See Comment, The Right of Publicity: Premature Burial For California's
Property Right in the Wake of Lugosi, 12 PAC. L.J. 987, 993 (1981).
66. The following cases represent examples of judicial decisions which have de-
nied relief to the descendants of someone whose "right of publicity" has been appropri-
ated after death. See Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965) (Al Capone's estate unsuccessful in assertion); Reeves v.
United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (Jimmy Reeve's widow not allowed
recovery for portrayal of husband in the movie "Raging Bull"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381
F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (Rosenberg's children un-
successfully challenged biography of executed parents); James v. Screen Gems, Inc.,
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tures6 7 illustrates the frustration that most courts have felt when
attempting to reconcile the descendibility issue.68 There, the widow
and surviving son of Bela Lugosi, of Dracula fame, brought suit for
damages and equitable relief against Universal Pictures for its ex-
ploitation of the Dracula character Lugosi had made so famous. 69 In
reversing a superior court decision for the plaintiffs, the California
Supreme Court held that "the right to exploit name and likeness is
personal to the artist and must be exercised, if at all, by him during
his lifetime."70
The court in justifying its position, however, left an ambiguity that
would finally be settled by the California Legislature.71 This incon-
sistency appears in the following language of the court: "[i]f rights to
the exploitation of artistic or intellectual property never exercised
during the lifetime of their creators were to survive their death,
neither society's interest in the free dissemination of ideas nor the
artist's rights to the fruits of his own labor would be served."72 What
is curious here is that the court qualifies its language to "intellectual
property never exercised during the lifetime of their creators . .. ."
Thus, did the court take the position that there is no descendible
right in California, or did it impliedly grant a qualified right depen-
174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959) (widow of Jesse James, Jr. unable to recover
for movie potrayal of deceased husband); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. App. 1982)
(denied recovery to dead pilot's descendents only because no commercial exploitation
as required under Florida statute); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372,
80 N.W. 285 (1899) (nonlibelous appropriation upheld to advertise cigars); Miller v.
Universal Pictures Co., 11 A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960) (Glen Miller's widow had
no property interest in the Glen Miller "sound"); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures
Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954) (portrayal of deceased entertainer not
"for purposes of trade" under statute). However, it should be realized that few of
these earlier cases were pure commercial exploitation decisions, as many are biograph-
ical in nature and thus allowed a noncommittal court a safe way out via the first
amendment.
67. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
68. For an earlier discussion of Lugosi, see Comment, Transfer of the Right of
Publicity: Dracula's Progeny and Privacy's Stepchild 22 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1975).
69. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 816-17, 603 P.2d at 427, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
70. Id at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The court also stated that
"such 'a right of value' to create a business, product or service of value is embraced in
the law of privacy and is protectable during one's lifetime but it does not survive the
death of Lugosi." Id at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (citing W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 807 (4th ed. 1971)).
71. In CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985), the California Legislature enacted
the most comprehensive descendibility bill concerning the "right of publicity" in the
country. See infra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
72. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
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dent on exploitation of it?7s Although the court does acknowledge
that the right is commercially exploitable, 74 the absence of any ex-
press language granting a descendible right if exploited should neces-
sitate the conclusion that the court denied any type of a survivable
right. However, subsequent judicial treatment curiously has treated
Lugosi as granting an inheritable right.75
Lugosi was reaffirmed in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Produc-
tions,76 which was a companion case to Lugosi. A nephew of the late
Rudolph Valentino had brought suit against the defendant produc-
tion company for misappropriation of his uncle's likeness in a fic-
tional depiction of the performer's life.77 The court denied the
nephew recovery and held "that the right of publicity protects
against the unauthorized use of one's name, likeness or personality,
but that right is not descendible and expires upon the death of the
person so protected."78 Similarly, Groucho Marx Productions v. Day
and Night Co.79 followed Lugosi when assignees of the Marx Broth-
ers were denied equitable relief against a musical which concerned
the late comedy trio.80 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, apply-
ing California law, ruled that a person's "right of publicity" termi-
73. In Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 1982),
the court discussed these two interpretations:
It may mean that California does not recognize any descendible right of pub-
licity and that the heirs of a celebrity must rely on trademark law to protect
the goodwill that the celebrity brought to a product during his lifetime.
Alternatively, Lugosi might mean that... California recognizes a descendi-
ble right of publicity that enables the heirs to prevent the use of a celebrity's
name and likeness on any product or service the celebrity promoted by ex-
ploiting his right of publicity during his lifetime.
74. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 818, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The court ac-
cepted the principle that during one's lifetime a person may commercially exploit his
name, face, or likeness. The court, citing Dean Prosser, also recognized assignability of
such a right, stating that one can "capitalize by selling licenses" of their right. Id, (cit-
ing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 117, at 807 (4th ed. 1971)).
75. Lugosi was interpreted in Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d
1538 (11th Cir. 1983), to grant an inheritable right. The court in Acme Circus applied
California law and surprisingly interpreted Lugosi to grant a survivable right if the ce-
lebrity has exploited it during his lifetime. Id at 1544. For a full discussion, see infra
notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
Other previous California decisions had failed to recognize a descendible right.
Strickler v. National Broadcasting Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958); and Kelly v.
Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 325 P.2d 659 (1958).
76. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
77. Id at 861, 603 P.2d at 455-56, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
78. Id. Chief Justice Bird, who usually champions a descendible right, concurred
in the opinion because the appropriation was for a biographical film and thus was pro-
tected by the first amendment. Id at 872, 603 P.2d at 462, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (Bird,
C.J., concurring).
79. 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
80. 1& at 320. For a general discussion of the Groucho Marx case, see Note, Fa-
mous Person's Right of Publicity is Descendible-The Need for a Durational Limit on
the Right of Publicity, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 190 (1983).
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nates at death.81
Ironically, this line of decisions will soon lose much of its persua-
sive value to other jurisdictions, as the California Legislature has
passed California Civil Code section 990,82 which became effective
January 1, 1985.83 The statute, being the most comprehensive of its
kind in the country, allows for a descendible "right of publicity,"
which is assertable for fifty years after the personality's death.8 4 The
creation of section 990 negates much of the judicial precedent which
had held that the "right of publicity" is not survivable.
Effective judicial precedent still exists which denies a descendible
"right of publicity." In Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors
Etc., Inc.,8 5 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to acknowl-
edge the descendibility of the "right of publicity." A Memphis non-
profit organization sought to enjoin the assignee of Elvis Presley's
"right of publicity" from interfering with the sale of Elvis statuettes
so that the profits could be used to erect a statue of the late musi-
cian.8 6 The court, in reversing the United States District Court,8 7
held that the right of the famous to control and profit from the com-
mercial use of their name and personality is not inheritable.8 8 The
court's reasoning was that "[a]fter death the opportunity for gain
shifts to the public domain, where it is equally open to all."89 The
policy reasons listed by the court for noninheritability included the
following: (1) the real motivation in acquiring fame is self-realiza-
tion; (2) the uncertainty in the duration such a right would last;
(3) the question of taxing the right; (4) interference with the first
amendment; and (5) applicability of the right to a limited class.90
81. Id. See supra note 73 and accompanying text for the Groucho Marx court's in-
terpretation of Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979).
82. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985).
83. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this new
statute.
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (West Supp. 1985).
85. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 960. The statuettes at twenty-five dollars apiece were to fund a statue in
memory of Elvis Presley to be erected in Memphis.
87. 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1970), rev'd, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980). The
lower court had held Presley's "right of publicity" was assignable and inheritable after
his death.
88. Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 957.
89. Id. "The memory, name and pictures of famous individuals should be regarded
as a common asset to be shared, an economic opportunity available in the free market
system." Id. at 960.
90. Id. at 958-59.
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The reasoning of the court that "the law has always thought that
leaving a good name to one's children is sufficient reward in itself"9 1
is highly questionable.
Although the Memphis Development court seemed to ignore the
current trend in the law, one other court has followed its lead. In
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,9 2 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, giving full faith to Memphis Development, reversed its own
earlier decision 93 which had held there was an inheritable "right of
publicity." The case arose when Factors became the assignee of Elvis
Presley's "right of publicity" after the star's death. The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that Pro Arts' appropriation of Presley's
picture for a memorial poster should be enjoined.94 However, on re-
mand to the United States District Court,95 an appeal was taken from
the permanent injunction which was issued. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals then reversed its earlier decision, holding that
Memphis Development was controlling law.96
What must be gained from these illustrative cases is that there is
great uncertainty with regard to the descendibility issue. The legisla-
tive challenging of Lugosi v. Universal Pictures97 in California and
the indecisiveness of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts Inc.98 illustrates the inherent difficulties courts
are realizing in deciding to deny a descendible "right of publicity."
Until a fully descendible right is recognized, the inconsistency in our
judicial forums will continue.
B. The Argument for Descendibility
1. Underlying Policy Considerations
The following discussion will concern the basic policy justifications
which support a survivable and descendible "right of publicity."
There are four major policy reasons necessitating a descendible right:
(1) it is a recognized property right and thus should descend as any
other intellectual property would; (2) a descendible right will provide
motivation and incentive for the personality; (3) without such a rec-
ognized right, advertisers would be unjustly enriched as they would
receive a windfall at a celebrity's death; and (4) because of the right's
91. Id. at 959.
92. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 102 S. Ct. 1973 (1982).
93. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), remanded, 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd,
652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
94. 579 F.2d at 222. The court held that a merchandiser's "exclusive right to ex-
ploit the Presley name and likeness, because exercised during Presley's life, survived
his death."
95. 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
96. 652 F.2d at 278.
97. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
98. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981).
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similarity to copyright law it should descend to a personality's de-
scendants for fifty years after his death.
The basic policy reason a court will use to justify a survivable
"right of publicity" is that it has developed "beyond its origins in pri-
vacy into a 'species of "property."' " 99 Since the "right of publicity"
during one's lifetime is considered to be a nonpersonal property
right, 0 0 it, like other property rights, should descend to one's
heirs.'o' Although some courts and authorities insist the property la-
bel is "immaterial," they still recognize that the "right of publicity" is
a thing of value which has inherent worth.102 Dean Prosser stated
the argument in the following terms:
The interest protected [in appropriation] is not so much a mental as a pro-
prietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiff's name and likeness as an
aspect of his identity. It seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a
right is to be classified as "property." If it is not, it is at least, once it is pro-
tected by the law, a right of value upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by
selling licenses. 1 0 3
Even if the "property" label is superfluous, the "right of publicity" is
acknowledged as a nonpersonal, assignable thing of inherent value.O4
99. Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D. Ohio 1982). For a dis-
cussion of inter vivos property rights in one's "right of publicity," see Uhlaender v.
Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282-83 (D. Minn. 1970) (baseball players had a "prop-
erty interest" in name and likeness); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q.
314, 316-17 (1957) (Ben Hogan, a professional golfer, had a property right of "good will"
and "commercial value"); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911)
(one has an exclusive right to his picture as a property right); Rosenberg v. Lee's Car-
pet & Furniture Warehouse Outlet, Inc., 80 Misc. 2d 479, 363 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (use of television personality's name and picture considered a valuable property
right).
100. Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. at 1235. The Restatement of Torts
states that "the protection of his personal feelings against mental distress is an impor-
tant factor leading to a recognition of the rule, the right created by it is in the nature
of a property right .... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment a (1977).
101. See Comment, The Right of Publicity - Protection for Public Figures and Ce-
lebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 547 (1976). "The financial benefits of that labor
should go to the celebrity's heirs as do all other property rights. ... Id.
102. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), where a court first recognized a "right of public-
ity," the property argument was addressed. The court stated that "[w]hether it be la-
belled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 'property'
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth." Id.
at 868. See also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960); Note, Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right of Publicity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 767-68
(1978).
103. Prosser, supra note 102, at 406.
104. See Nimmer, supra note 33, at 216. In this influential article, Melville Nimmer
recognized early that the "right of publicity" should be a property right instead of a
personal one.
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Therefore, like all other property rights, it should descend at one's
death.
A survivable "right of publicity" also serves as incentive for indi-
viduals to reach their ultimate potential. Since one would know his
heirs would ultimately receive the fruits of his labors, this would pro-
vide a "motivational effect" to the individual that would benefit eve-
ryone concerned.105 Chief Justice Bird, dissenting in Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures,106 argued that "providing legal protection for the
economic value in one's identity against unauthorized commercial ex-
ploitation creates a powerful incentive for expending time and re-
sources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public
recognition and assures that the individual will be able 'to reap the
reward of his endeavors . . . . "'107 Although the public domain
would not receive the commercial benefits of a personality's name
and likeness at his death, society will receive a more beneficial gift as
the personality will have more incentive to reach his potential in his
respective pursuits.
Another policy justification for a survivable right is that advertis-
ers should not be unjustly enriched and receive a windfall upon a ce-
lebrity's death. The underlying policy of the "right of publicity" is to
prevent unjust enrichment.10 8 The advertiser unjustly receives bene-
fits of another's lifetime labors, which should rightly descend to his
descendants.10 9 To allow such a windfall violates all notions of fair-
ness inherent in our legal system.110
The final policy consideration for requiring a descendible "right of
publicity" is that in analogizing the issue to copyright law one can ar-
gue publicity, like copyrights, should be inheritable. Article one of
the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
105. "[Tlhe possibility of providing for one's heirs may have a motivational effect
during one's life." Felcher & Rubin, supra note 21, at 1619.
106. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 840, 603 P.2d 425, 441, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 339 (1979).
107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. This was best stated in Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren And
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEmp. PRoBs. 326, 331 (1966). "The rationale for [pro-
tecting the right of publicity] is the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrich-
ment by the theft of good will." Id.
109. The Restatement of Torts takes this position: "[s]ince appropriation of name or
likeness is similar to impairment of a property right and involves an aspect of unjust
enrichment of the defendants (sic) or his estate, survival rights may be held to exist
following the death of either party." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 com-
ment b (1977).
110. See Comment, supra note 101, at 547. The author argues "[t]here is no reason
why, upon a celebrity's death, advertisers should receive a windfall in the form of free-
dom to use with impunity the name or likeness of the deceased celebrity who may
have worked his or her entire life to attain celebrity status." Id.
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... Writings ."hi From this grant of power Congress has
passed the Copyright Act of 1976,112 which allows for the
survivability and descendibility of a copyrighted work.ll3 However,
the interests protected under the "right of publicity" do not consti-
tute a "writing"'1 4 as required under the Constitution,115 nor is pub-
licity part or parcel of any of the enumerated categories covered in
the Copyright Act.n16 Therefore, copyright law serves only as an
analogy to the issue of descendibility and the copyright preemption
doctrine should not apply to the "right of publicity."' 1 7
Copyright law, like the "right of publicity," gives the individual
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
112. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
113. Id. § 201(d)(1). "The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or
in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by
will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession." Id
114. The United States Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561
(1972), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973), defined writings "to include any physical ren-
dering of the fruits of creative, intellectual or aesthetic labor." Chief Justice Bird, dis-
senting in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 849, 603 P.2d 425, 448, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 346 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), argued that the intangible "right of public-
ity" is not a "writing" and therefore not subject to congressional regulation.
See also Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). "The intangible proprietary interest protected by the right of publicity simply
does not constitute a writing; (citation omitted) and therefore falls outside of the pre-
emption standards established by Congress in the copyright law (citations omitted)."
Id.
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) provides as follows:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
117. At least one author has attempted to apply the preemption doctrine of 17
U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982), to "right of publicity" decisions. Note, Copyright and the Right
of Publicity: One Pea in Two Pods?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1577-78 (1983). The preemption
section of the Copyright Act provides that works under the statute "are governed ex-
clusively by this title." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982). Thus, any common law or statute of
a state would be preempted by the application of the Act, as in a case where the appro-
priation involved a work covered by the Copyright Act. If copyright law does not ap-
ply, then state law would govern. However, this argument must be dismissed because
the "right of publicity" could not at this time be included under the Copyright Act's
protections.
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"exclusive rights"11s in order to protect an appropriation of creative
efforts.1i9 Whether an author registers a copyright or a celebrity ex-
ploits his likeness, both have a protectable property interest.1 20
Therefore, in analogizing publicity to the Copyright Act of 1976,121 it
must be recognized that both of these proprietary interests should be
survivable and descendible to one's heirs.122
2. The Judicial Trend
The recognition of an inheritable "right of publicity" has become a
trend in the judicial forums of this country in the last decade.123
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.124 was the first decision to acknowl-
edge a freely descendible "right of publicity" even though the dece-
dents had never exploited their names or likenesses during their
lifetimes.125 In this decision the widows of Stan Laurel and Oliver
Hardy and the assignee of the comedians' rights successfully chal-
lenged the commercial appropriation of the late duo's rights by de-
fendant Roach and its assignees. 126 The court in recognizing that the
right does not terminate at death stated, "[t]here cannot . . . be any
necessity to exercise the right of publicity during one's life in order
to protect it from use by others or to preserve any potential right of
one's heirs."12 7 Thus, for the first time a descendible "right of public-
118. One author puts it in this manner: "[a]s copyright gives authors exclusive
rights in their creative works, the right of publicity gives individuals exclusive rights in
their personas." Note, supra note 117, at 1572.
119. "Like the right of publicity, the underlying policy of copyright is to provide an
incentive for enterprise and creativity by allowing individuals to benefit from their
personal efforts." Felcher & Rubin, The Descendiblity of the Right of Publicity: Is
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1129 (1980).
120. "Both 'registration' and 'exploitation' manifest the artist's or celebrity's recog-
nition of the commercial value of his creation and his intention to protect that value
for himself and his heirs." Note, Famous Person's Right of Publicity is Descendible-
The Need for a Durational Limit on the Right of Publicity, 14 SETON HALL L. REV.
190, 209 (1983).
121. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
122. For a good discussion of copyright application to the "right of publicity," see
Note, supra note 117, at 1567.
123. The following decisions recognized a descendible right of one sort or another:
Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983); Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., 694 F.2d
674 (11th Cir. 1983); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); Hicks
v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative
Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); and Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d
620, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977).
124. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
125. Id. at 846.
126. Id.
127. Id. In Price v. Worldvision Enterprises, 455 F. Supp. 252, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment because under the doctrine of res judi-
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ity" was recognized, even in the absence of exploitation by the celeb-
rity during his lifetime.
The decision of Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co.128 purported
to follow the reasoning of Price, in recognizing a descendible "right
of publicity." The case dealt with the assignees of Elvis Presley's
right of publicity attempting to obtain injunctive relief against the
defendant manufacturer to prevent it from using the late enter-
tainer's likeness in a poster.129 The court did follow the precedent of
Price;130 however, they conditioned their holding upon the fact that
Elvis Presley had exploited his right during his lifetime. 13 1 Thus, in-
consistency already existed concerning the descendibility issue, even
where the decisions both arose from the same court.
Hicks v. Casablanca Records'3 2 similarly ignored the Price ration-
ale in holding that the "right of publicity" is only inheritable if ex-
ploited during the lifetime of the celebrity.133 The case arose when
the heirs of Agatha Christie, the famous mystery writer, sought to
enjoin the production of a movie and publication of a book concern-
ing the late writer.134 Although the court found for the defendants
based upon the first amendment biographical privilege,135 they ex-
pressed the opinion that the right should never descend unless ex-
cata Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), had already de-
cided the issues presented.
This principle of descendibility was recognized by a New York state court (Price was
in a federal court) in Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 396
N.Y.S.2d 661 (1977). The court stated in dicta that "while a cause of action under the
Civil Rights Law is not assignable during one's lifetime and terminates at death, the
right to publicity ... is under no such inhibition." Id. at 621, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
128. 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
129. Id.
130. 1Id at 284. The court in giving credence to Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400
F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), stated "[t]here is no reason why the valuable right of pub-
licity--clearly exercised by and financially benefiting Elvis Presley in life-should not
descend at death like any other intangible property right." 444 F. Supp. at 284 (empha-
sis in original).
131. 444 F. Supp. at 284.
132. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
133. Id. at 429 (citing Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d at 222 n.11). The
court defined "exploitation" in the following manner: "a party claiming the right must
establish that the decedent acted in such a way as to evidence his or her own recogni-
tion of the extrinsic commercial value of his or her name or likeness, and manifested
that recognition in some overt manner .. " Id.
134. Id at 428-29.
135. Id. at 433. "[T]his Court finds that the first amendment protection usually ac-
corded novels and movies outweighs whatever publicity rights plaintiffs may possess
and for this reason their complaints must be dismissed." Id. For a full discussion of
the biographical privilege, see infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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ploited by the celebrity during his life.136
Similarly, Estate of Presley v. Russen137 qualified its grant of a de-
scendible right on it "having been exercised during the individual's
life and thus having attained a concrete form. ... 138 Interestingly,
the decision arose when Elvis Presley's estate sought relief against an
impersonator who conducted "the Big El Show." 139 The court, in
finding that the show did not have the requisite informational and
entertainment value for a first amendment privilege, held the
"Show" should be enjoined because it was primarily for commercial
gain.140 Thus, these cases illustrate the trend to acknowledge a de-
scendible "right of publicity," but only if the personality during his
lifetime exploited that right in some overt manner.
The decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Martin
Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Products, Inc.,141 adopted a different theory in acknowledging a de-
scendible "right of publicity" in Georgia.142 The court ruled that the
"right of publicity" survives the death of its owner even if the owner
had not commercially exploited the right during his or her life.143
This case dealt with the heirs and assignees of Martin Luther King
who brought suit to enjoin the defendant's production and sale of
busts of the late civil rights advocate.14 4 The court, in acknowledging
a descendible "right of publicity," held that "a person who avoids ex-
ploitation during life is entitled to have his image protected against
exploitation after death, just as much if not more than a person who
exploited his image during life." 145 This argument for a descendible
"right of publicity" even in the absence of exploitation during one's
lifetime must be the better position to take on the descendibility is-
sue. One who values his privacy and thus does not greedily exploit
his notoriety should be given equivalent or even greater protection to
his "right of publicity" upon his death.
A recent decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Acme
136. Id. at 429.
137. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
138. Id. at 1355. The court held "that Elvis Presley's right of publicity survived his
death and became part of his estate." Id
139. Id. at 1348.
140. Id at 1361. In discussing the biographical privilege, the court stated that "[i]f,
however, the portrayal functions primarily as a means of commercial exploitation,
then such immunity will not be granted." Id at 1356.
141. 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983).
142. This decision was entirely based upon certified questions issued by the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Georgia Supreme
Court's answers are appended to the Eleventh Circuit Court's opinion as "Exhibit A."
Id. at 675-87. See also 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697 (1982).
143. 694 F.2d at 683.
144. Id. at 675.
145. Id. at 683.
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Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock146 has strengthened the surviv-
able "right of publicity." There, Clyde Beatty, a famous animal
trainer, had assigned his name to be used in connection with the cir-
cus he previously had owned. After Beatty's death, the defendants
failed to continue payment for this license and Beatty's widow
brought the action. 14 7 The federal court of appeals sitting in Florida
applied California law148 to decide that a descendible "right of public-
ity" exists "where the right was exercised during the lifetime and
turned into a commercial venture or other contract right ....- 149
In approving the Second Circuit's analysis of Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
tures,150 the court surprisingly interpreted Lugosi to impliedly grant
a survivable "right of publicity":
We thus interpret Lugosi to say that where a right to publicity of a name has
been exercised in conjunction with a specific product or business during a life-
time sufficiently to create a secondary meaning in that name and the right to
use that name in conjunction with the same product or business has been val-
idly assigned to another, the rights flowing therefrom survive the death of the
assignor. 15 1
Thus, even Lugosi has now been interpreted to acknowledge a
survivable "right of publicity" if the decedent exploits that right dur-
ing his lifetime.
Most judicial authority refuses to give credence to Memphis Devel-
opment Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.152 and its limited progeny,
and the federal judicial trend as witnessed by this line of precedent is
to uphold a survivable and inheritable "right of publicity" when the
decedent has exploited his name or likeness during his lifetime.
146. 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983).
147. Id. at 1539-40.
148. Id. at 1540. "The district court correctly noted that because this diversity ac-
tion was transferred from the Central District of California to the Middle District of
Florida, it was to apply the choice of laws principles on which the Central District of
California would have relied." Id. (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 1544 (emphasis omitted).
150. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in Groucho Marx Prods. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1982), held Lugosi is capable of two interpretations: either that the "right of publicity"
is not descendible at all or it is descendible if exploited by the owner during his life-
time. Id. at 323. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
151. 711 F.2d at 1544 (citing Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 826-27, 603 P.2d at 433, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 330 (Mosk, J., concurring)). The court in interpreting Lugosi in such a loose
manner stated that to hold "that the publicity interest never survives ... would mean
much of the Lugosi majority opinion is pure dicta and surplusage." Id at 1543. The
court reasoned the continual "juxtaposition" of factual exploitation situations by the
court in the Lugosi opinion showed an intent to acknowledge a descendible right if ex-
ploited during one's life. Id,
152. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
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3. Restrictions on Descendibility
a. Exploitation - A Condition Precedent to Survival?
Exploitation has become almost a recognized concept in acknowl-
edging an inheritable "right of publicity." 5 3 Exploitation is the rec-
ognition of the "extrinsic commercial value" in one's own name or
likeness and the attempt to profit from it in an "overt manner."54
Activities which constitute exploitation include assignment of one's
rights during his or her lifetime and commercial endorsement of a
product. 5 5 The rationale behind the requirement of exploitation is
that the courts require some recognizable right to uphold after death.
If in a "concrete form," the extension of the "right of publicity" into
an inheritable right is more easily accomplished. 56
Although some courts have failed to recognize an inheritable right
even where the decedent has exploited it, 157 the trend has been to ac-
knowledge a descendible right if it was exploited in the owner's life-
time.158 Hicks v. Casablanca Records159 stands for the principle that
a descendible "right of publicity" exists if this right has been ex-
ploited during the life of the decedent.16 0 This principle has been fol-
lowed by other courts161 and even applied to Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures.162 However, basic disagreement still exists over the ex-
ploitation requirement.
153. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For argu-
ments pro and con on the exploitation controversy, see Ausness, The Right of Public-
ity: A "Haystack in a Hurricane," 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977 (1982); Hoffman, The Right of
Publicity - Heir's Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Court's Nightmare? 31 DE PAUL
L. REV. 1 (1981); Note, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Requirement as
a Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1703 (1983).
154. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
155. See Note, supra note 153, at 1712.
156. Some authorities go too far and argue that the right is only descendible if in
contract form. Felcher & Rubin, supra note 119, at 1130-31 ("these rights should be
protected only when they have been translated into concrete form through the me-
dium of a contract"); Kwall, supra note 35, at 210 ("right of publicity actions ... can
be assigned or licensed during an individual's lifetime and made the subject of an ex-
press or implied contract").
157. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). The court held that "the right of publicity should not be
given the status of a devisable right, even where as here a person exploits the right by
contract during life." Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 123-52.
159. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
160. Id. at 429. For more on Hicks, see supra text accompanying notes 132-36.
161. Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983); Es-
tate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981); and Factors Etc., Inc. v. Cre-
ative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
162. In Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1983),
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, applying California law in a diversity suit, held
that Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979),
should stand for the proposition that there is an inheritable right if it is exploited in
one's lifetime. 711 F.2d at 1544. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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The decision of Grant v. Esquire, Inc.163 was the first to distinguish
between an exploitative and nonexploitative right. 6 4 The court held
that actor Cary Grant was not required to have exploited his "right
of publicity" in order to enjoin the defendant magazine from using
his name and likeness in a clothing advertisement. 165 Similarly,
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.' 66 recognized a freely descendible
right even though the decedent comedians had not exploited their
right while alive.167 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit in Martin Luther
King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod-
ucts, Inc.,168 held that "a person who avoids exploitation during life is
entitled to have his image protected against exploitation after death
just as much if not more than a person who exploited his image dur-
ing life."169
This judicial split of authority must be reconciled by the uniform
adoption of a freely descendible "right of publicity," with no exploita-
tion requirement. Inherent difficulties with an exploitation require-
ment include: (1) absence of an appropriate medium to exploit the
right; (2) the early and untimely death of a celebrity; (3) the absten-
tion from publicity in order to leave a legacy to heirs; (4) difficulty in
determining whether exploitation occurred;170 and (5) the basic right
of one to avoid publicity even though in the public limelight. In
short, an exploitation requirement shuns everything the "right of
publicity" encompasses, which is not only the prevention of unjust
enrichment, but also the protection of one's privacy.
b. Durational Limitations or Laughing Heirs?
An unlimited durational period for a survivable "right of publicity"
would lead to a multitude of suits by distant laughing heirs of famous
ancestors.' 7 ' This is illustrated by Schumann v. Loew's, Inc.,' 72
163. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
164. 1I at 880.
165. Id
166. 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See supra text accompanying notes 124-27 for
more on Price.
167. Id at 846.
168. 694 F.2d 674 (1983).
169. Id. at 683. For more on Martin Luther King, see supra text accompanying
notes 141-45.
170. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 848, 603 P.2d 425, 447, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 345 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
171. One is termed a laughing heir when his remote relation to the decedent causes
him to joyfully welcome the death of such decedent so that he may reap the benefits of
his testamentary disposition. See Note, supra note 102. "A plethora of suits by distant
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which denied relief to descendants of the famous composer over one
hundred years after his death.173 The problem of laughing heirs can
only be solved by creating some sort of judicial or legislative dura-
tional limit.
Since property lawi74 is hardly applicable to an intangible property
right such as the "right of publicity," one must examine copyright
law and statutory schemes for a solution. The Copyright Act of
1976175 can serve as an analogyi76 in determining a durational
limit.17 7 The Act provides that a newly copyrighted work shall be
valid through the author's life and for fifty years thereafter. 7 8 Chief
Justice Bird, dissenting in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 79 argued
that this "period represents a reasonable evaluation of the period
necessary to effect the policies underlying the right of publicity."180
Thus, copyright law is one recognizable solution.
Of the seven jurisdictions which today provide a statutory, descend-
ible "right of publicity,"181 California, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee,
and Virginia recognize a durational limit. California's newly-enacted
bill and Kentucky's statute 8 2 provide for a fifty-year limitation after
descendants of historical figures could result from a rule of unlimited descent." I& at
772.
172. 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954), afdc 144 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
173. 135 N.Y.S.2d at 369. The descendants of Schumann failed to obtain damages
against defendant for a motion picture which dealt with the life of the famous
composer.
174. Under property law, the right of publicity would first pass to one under a spe-
cific bequest, then to residuary legatees, and finally to descendants by intestacy. See
Comment, supra note 68, at 1119. See also Note, supra note 101, at 549 (author argues
for a fully descendible "right of publicity" based on property law).
175. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 111-22.
177. For a discussion of the fifty-year durational limit, see Felcher & Rubin, supra
note 119, at 1131.
178. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
179. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, 603 P.2d 425, 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 344 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
180. Id. Several authors make the copyright analogy, but it is best expressed in
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 119, at 1229. They support the copyright analogy by the
following argument:
Like the right of publicity, the underlying policy of copyright is to provide an
incentive for enterprise and creativity by allowing individuals to benefit from
their personal efforts. Copyright is also similar to the right of publicity in that
the control it grants involves a substantial possibility of conflict with the First
Amendment. These similarities suggest that copyright, not privacy, defama-
tion, or property, is the proper analogy for defining the operation of the right
of publicity.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
181. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(4) (West
1972); Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.170 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1982); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1, 839.2 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103, 47-25-1104
(1984); and VA. CODE § 18.2-216.1 (1982).
182. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985). This bill introduced by State Senator
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the death of the celebrity.18 3 Florida's is forty years, Virginia's is
twenty years, and Tennessee only provides for a ten-year period.18 4
Undoubtedly, Tennessee's period is too brief, since valuable publicity
rights will still exist and the decedent's lineal descendants will still
be alive when the period expires. California's and Kentucky's fifty-
year limitations, the longest in the country, serve the purpose for
which they were created-to protect a decedent's name and charac-
ter, and to entitle descendants to their rightful legacy. Any shorter
period neglects the theory of having a descendibility statute in the
first place.
Since an estate is primarily designed to benefit those individuals
who were living during the decedent's lifetime and would subse-
quently survive him,185 the rigidity of a fixed statutory duration is
not the answer. A more logical solution, that would serve as a valid
incentive to celebrities, is to allow the statutory, durational period to
extend for the lives of the surviving spouse and any issue the couple
might have had. This flexible standard insures that either the spouse
or children will receive the full benefits of their decedent's legacy
while they are alive.
C First Amendment Concerns
Since every public use of a celebrity's name or likeness does not
necessitate financial gain by the celebrity,186 one must consider con-
flicting issues arising out of the first amendment.1s 7 Theoretically,
the "right of publicity," being of commercial value, should never con-
William Campbell provides "the strongest safeguards in the country for heirs of the
famous." Variety, Oct. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 3. It became effective January 1, 1985.
183. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.170 (1984) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (West Supp.
1985), which provide: "No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any
use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness occur-
ring after the expiration of 50 years from the death of the deceased personality."
184. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(4) (West 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103,
47-25-1104 (1984); VA. CODE § 18.2-216.1 (1984).
185. See Note, s-upra note 102, at 773. "Estates are generally intended for those per-
sons who were alive during the decedent's lifetime and would be expected to survive
his or her death." Id
186. See Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(supplemental decision) ("It is not every public use of a prominent person's name that
he has a right to exploit financially."); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d
444, 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (the right of publicity "does not invest a
prominent person with the right to exploit financially every public use of name or
picture").
187. "When publicity rights are involved, recognition must be given . . . to the
countervailing policy of the First Amendment interest in the free use of information."
Felcher & Rubin, supra note 119, at 1128.
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flict with free speech. l88 However, when the means of appropriation
take the form of speech the two concepts collide.1s 9
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their seminal article on pri-
vacy1 90 argued that "[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit any pub-
lication of matter which is of public or general interest."191 In
following this principle, courts have held that the "right of publicity"
must succumb to the public's interest in the free dissemination of
ideas and information. 9 2 However, this first amendment protection
will not bar a "right of publicity" action where the account is bla-
tantly false 9 3 or primarily for commercial exploitation.194 This lat-
ter principle was elaborated on by the Supreme Court in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. 195 There, plaintiff Hugo Zacchini
sought relief for a telecast of his entire "human cannonball act" on
defendant's station. 9 6 The Court held "that the First and Four-
188. See Note, supra note 101, at 527. The author argues there is no overlapping of
the concepts of free speech and publicity since "the right of publicity Is not a restric-
tion on free speech because material that is the object of the right's protection is thor-
oughly commercial, beyond the reach of the first amendment." Id. at 549.
189. This primarily includes books, newspapers, and movies. See Kwall, supra note
35, at 230.
190. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 7, at 193.
191. Id. at 214.
192. The following decisions barred a "right of publicity" claim when the publica-
tion was protected by the first amendment: Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 3089 (1983) (an exclusive magazine interview
with Cher); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940) (child prodigy's biographical sketch in magazine); Ann-Margaret v. High
Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Ann-Margaret unsuccessful in
suit against magazine for publication of nude photograph of her); Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (movie and book concerning Agatha Chris-
tie); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 449 N.Y.S.2d
941, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1982) (New York Times Magazine article on the black
middle class); Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (publication of Elvis Presley's press conference); and Paulsen v. Per-
sonality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (publishing of
"Paulsen For President" poster upheld, as comedian in election).
193. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
The court there held that a National Enquirer story concerning Clint Eastwood in a
"love triangle" with two other personalities was a deliberate falsification for commer-
cial exploitation of the magazine, and therefore the first amendment should not allow
it protection. Id. at 426, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
For a slightly different perspective, see Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp.
426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court held that "the right of publicity does not attach
... where a fictionalized account of an event in the life of a public figure is depicted in
a novel or a movie, and it is evident to the public that the events so depicted are ficti-
tious." Id.
194. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). The court here
held that an Elvis impersonator lacked the requisite informational and entertainment
value to be protected by the first amendment. The court stated that "[i]f ... the por-
trayal functions primarily as a means of commercial exploitation, then such immunity
will not be granted." Id at 1356 (citation omitted).
See also Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952).
195. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
196. Id. at 563-64.
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teenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broad-
cast a performer's entire act without his consent."'19 7 Thus, where
the speech is primarily for commercial exploitation, first amendment
protections should not apply.
Even though people have gained prominence and notoriety, they
still have a distinct right to prohibit the use of their names or like-
nesses, even if newsworthy, from commercial exploitation.198 Yet,
widely recognized first amendment doctrines, such as the "biographi-
cal privilege," do not allow this to be an absolute right.199 Thus, the
"right of publicity" is severely limited when a literary work or movie
portrays biographical information concerning a celebrity.2 00
The first amendment in relation to a descendible "right of public-
ity" will struggle through the same conflicts as the inter vivos right
has.201 Although it may be argued the descent of one's "right of pub-
licity" will only limit the free dissemination of information and
ideas,202 the real purpose of preventing unjust enrichment by com-
mercial exploitation will be better served by an inheritable right.
The death of a celebrity will not then restrict first amendment
197. Id. at 575.
198. Brinkley v. Casablanca Records, 80 A.D.2d 428, 433, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1008
(1981) (citations omitted). See Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp.
401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). "It is clear that a public figure does not, simply by nature of his or
her notoriety lose all rights of privacy ... ." Id. at 404 (citations omitted).
199. The following decisions represent examples of "right of publicity" actions
which have failed because of the "biographical privilege": Sidis v. F-R Publishing
Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940) (magazine article); Hicks
v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (movie); Estate of Hemingway
v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968) (book);
Frosch v. Grosset Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980) (book); and Don-
ahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954)
(movie).
200. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877,
vacated, 387 U.S. 239 (1966). There the court held "[t]he factual reporting of news-
worthy persons and events is in the public interest and protected." Id. at 328, 221
N.E.2d at 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
However, when a game manufacturer has attempted to legitimize his appropriation
based on the "biographical privilege" the courts have recognized an enforceable "right
of publicity." See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458
(1967) (Arnold Palmer and other professional golfers); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Ur-
ban Sys. Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (Howard Hughes
assignee).
201. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 (D.N.J. 1981) (where
the court discussed first amendment concerns in holding an Elvis impersonator had
exploited the late Elvis Presley's "right of publicity").
202. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
329.
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speech, as one's heirs will only be enforcing a right that had previ-
ously been exercised by the decedent.
1. A Legislative Solution
The inability of the judiciary to adopt a consistent approach to a
descendible "right of publicity" necessitates a legislative solution to
the problem. Currently, several states203 have some sort of appropri-
ation statute, and of these only seven allow for a survivable and de-
scendible "right of publicity."204 A uniform descent statute would
alleviate all uncertainty which has plagued the "right of publicity."
California recently enacted the most comprehensive descent stat-
ute of its kind in the country.205 It provides for a freely descendible
203. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1972);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 391.170 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West Supp.
1984-1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (1982); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney
1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1, 45-3-6 (1978); and VA. CODE §§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216.1
(1984).
204. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1972);
KY. REV. STAT. § 391.170 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 839.20 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103, 47-25-1104 (1984); and VA.
CODE §§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216.1 (1984).
205. CAL. CiV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985). The significant provisions of the stat-
ute are as follows:
(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, prod-
ucts, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent from the person
or persons specified in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sus-
tained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any
action brought under this section, the person who violated the section shall be
liable to the injured party or parties in an amount equal to the greater of
seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered by the
injured party or parties, as a result of the unauthorized use, and any profits
from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are not taken
into account in computing the actual damages .... Punitive damages may also
be awarded to the injured party or parties. The prevailing party or parties in
any action under this section shall also be entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.
(b) The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely
transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of trust or testa-
mentary documents, whether the transfer occurs before the death of the de-
ceased personality, by the deceased personality or his or her transferees, or,
after the death of the deceased personality, by the person or persons in whom
such rights vest under this section or the transferees of that person or
persons.
(d) Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), after the death of any person, the
rights under this section shall belong to the following person or persons and
may be exercised, on behalf of and for the benefit of all of those persons, by
those persons who, in the aggregate, are entitled to more than a one-half in-
terest in such rights:
(1) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving spouse of
the deceased personality unless there are any surviving children or
grandchildren of the deceased personality, in which case one-half of the en-
tire interest in those rights belong to the surviving spouse.
(2) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving children of
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"right of publicity," which is enforceable by the surviving spouse,
children, or parents of the decedent for fifty years following his
the deceased personality and to the surviving children of any dead child of
the deceased personality unless the deceased personality has a surviving
spouse, in which case the ownership of a one-half interest in rights is di-
vided among the surviving children and grandchildren.
(3) If there is no surviving spouse, and no surviving children or
grandchildren, then the entire interest in those rights belong to the surviv-
ing parent or parents of the deceased personality.
(4) The rights of the deceased personality's children and grandchildren
are in all cases divided among them and exercisable on a per stirpes basis
according to the number of the deceased personality's children represented
(e) If any deceased personality does not transfer his or her rights under this
section by contract, or by means of a trust or testamentary document, and
there are no surviving persons as described in subdivision (d), then the rights
set forth in subdivision (a) shall terminate.
(f) (2) Any person claiming to be a successor-in-interest to the rights of a
deceased personality under this section or a licensee thereof may register that
claim with the Secretary of State on a form prescribed by the Secretary of
State and upon payment of a fee of ten dollars ($10) ....
(g) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any use of a
deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness occur-
ring after the expiration of 50 years from the death of the deceased personal-
ity.
(h) As used in this section, "deceased personality" means any natural per-
son whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial
value at the time of his or her death, whether or not during the lifetime of
that natural person the person used his or her name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for purposes of
advertising or selling, or solicitation or purchase of, products, merchandise,
goods or service. A "deceased personality" shall include, without limitation,
any such natural person who has died within 50 years prior to January 1, 1985.
(j) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broad-
cast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which
consent is required under subdivision (a).
(k) The use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in a com-
mercial medium shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under
subdivison (a) solely because the material containing such use is commercially
sponsored or contains paid advertising. Rather it shall be a question of fact
whether or not the use of the deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness was so directly connected with the commercial spon-
sorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is
required under subdivision (a).
(1) Nothing in this section shall apply. . . unless it is established that such
owners or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use ....
(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances:
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death.20 6 This is the longest statutory period recognized today for a
descendible "right of publicity." Of major significance is a provision
which states that the decedent need not exploit his "name, voice, sig-
nature, photograph, or likeness" to be entitled to the statute's protec-
tions.207 Thus, the California Legislature went against the judicial
precedent, which had earlier required exploitation before the "right
of publicity" could descend.208 Also, it is important to note that
"knowledge of the unauthorized use" is required before the appropri-
ation can be actionable.209 This intent provision, coupled with one re-
quiring each appropriation to be "a question of fact,"210 illustrates the
legislature's unwillingness to accept a strict liability theory.
Unfortunately, no other jurisdiction has adopted a statute as tech-
nical and comprehensive as California's.211 To obtain uniformity
among our jurisdictions a model statute should be considered which
would allow for a freely survivable and inheritable "right of public-
ity." The following model statute is proposed as a guide:
Model Statute
(1) Acts Constituting Violation - No person, firm, or corporation shall use
a deceased person's name, voice, signature, portrait, likeness, or photograph
for any type of commercial advertising, solicitation, or publicity without first
obtaining written authorization from such person(s) as specified in subdivision
(3).
(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio
or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial an-
nouncement not exempt under paragraph (4).
(2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.
(3) Single and original works of fine art.
(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted
by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).
206. 1& § 990(d), (g). Unlike other jurisdictions, California set down a testamentary
scheme for the descendibility of the "right of publicity." First, it should pass to the
surviving spouse, and he or she would share the right with any children or grandchil-
dren alive. If there is no surviving spouse then the surviving children and their chil-
dren would take. Finally, the decedent's parent or parents will inherit the right, but if
they are deceased and the right has not been assigned, it terminates. Id. § 990(e).
207. Id § 990(h).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
209. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990.
210. 1& § 990(k).
211. Only six other jurisdictions have a statute acknowledging a descendible right.
Florida's (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1982)), is one of the most comprehensive of
the seven. Section 540.08(1)(c) reads: "If such person is deceased, any person, firm or
corporation authorized in writing to license the commercial use of his name or like-
ness, or if no person, firm or corporation is so authorized, then by anyone from among
a class composed of his surviving spouse and surviving children." Unlike California's
new statute, this statute is silent on the question of the exploitation requirement.
Ironically, Tennessee imposes no exploitation requirement on the celebrity, but the ex-
ecutor, assignee, or heir must exploit the right or the right will lapse. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-1104 (1984).
The statutes of Kentucky, Virginia, Nebraska, and Oklahoma are even less helpful
in explanatory terms because they all summarily recognize the descendible right and
do little more. KY. REV. STAT. 391-170 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1982); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1, 839.2 (West 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-216.1 (1982).
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(2) Ownership of Right - Upon the death of the deceased person, the
rights under this section will automatically and immediately descend to the
person(s) specified in subdivision (3). The rights enforced under this section
are property rights; therefore, they are assignable before and after death of
the deceased person, and capable of testamentary disposition.
(3) Descent of Right - The right enumerated in subdivison (1) shall, in the
absence of trust, testamentary disposition or assignment, descend with full un-
divided ownership rights to the following person(s): (a) the surviving spouse
shall take the full undivided ownership right; (b) if the spouse has prede-
ceased the deceased person or predeceases the surviving children, then said
right shall descend to the surviving children of the deceased person; (c) the
right shall terminate at the death of the surviving spouse or at the death of
the last surviving child, whichever is later.
(4) Exploitation - The right under this section will descend whether or
not the deceased person during his lifetime exploited his or her name, voice,
signature, portrait, likeness, or photograph, in some overt manner.
(5) Culpability - Any person found to be in violation of subdivision (1)
shall be held liable for such remedies as are provided under subdivision (8)
regardless of that person's intent, knowledge, or state of mind in connection
with the unauthorized appropriation. Nothing in this subdivision applies to
the owners, agents, or employees of the means of communication used for
such appropriation unless some type of intent, knowledge or culpable state of
mind is shown in connection with the unauthorized use, wherein joint and
severable liability attaches.
(6) Duration - The right protected under this section shall terminate and
accede to the public domain at the death of the surviving spouse or at the
death of the last surviving child of the deceased person, whichever is later.
(7) Exemptions - The provisions of this section shall not apply to the use
of a deceased person's name, voice, signature, portrait, likeness, or photograph
in: (a) any newspaper, book, magazine, film, television or radio broadcast
which concerns a legitimate public interest; (b) any literary, artistic, or musi-
cal creation; and (c) any publication that has some type of newsworthiness.
(8) Remedies - For violation of subdivision (1) of this section, the violator
will be liable to the injured person(s) specified in subdivision (3) under the
following remedies: (a) minimum damages of $1,000 or the amount of actual
damages, whichever is higher; (b) any profits obtained by the illegal. use; (c)
punitive damages; (d) injunctive relief; and (e) attorney's fees and costs.
The significant distinction between this model and California section
990212 is the approach to the lineal descendants who would inherit
the right. Instead of enforcing an inflexible fifty-year limit, as in Cal-
ifornia,213 the natural objects of a deceased's bounty would be better
served by a right which only terminates at the last surviving child's
or spouse's death. The inflexibility of a fixed requirement may be
too long if all the lineal descendants have died, or too brief if the sur-
viving spouse lives for a significant time beyond a prematurely de-
ceased spouse, thereby excluding the children. Furthermore, with
knowledge that one's heirs will be assured of receiving his "right of
212. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985).
213. Id. § 990(g). See supra notes 205-06.
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publicity," a celebrity will have more incentive to reach his ultimate
potential. Testamentary dispositions are for the benefit of those alive
during the decedent's lifetime.214 Thus, a flexible approach terminat-
ing the right at the death of the last surviving, immediate family
member will best serve the interests of one's heirs and society. An-
other distinction between this proposed model and California's sec-
tion 990 is the degree of culpability required of the violator.
California's section 990(k) consciously neglects to impose a strict lia-
bility standard; rather, it requires each case to be judged on a "ques-
tion of fact" to determine if the appropriation is "directly connected"
with some sort of commercial exploitation. 215 However, under subdi-
vision (5) of the proposed model statute, the violator would be held
strictly liable once it is determined he had made an unauthorized ap-
propriation. This standard ignores any question of scienter. It seems
to be a more equitable solution to place the burden of proof on the
party violating the statute instead of requiring the injured party to
prove some evidence of an intent to commercially exploit.
A final distinction between the two descendibility statutes is sec-
tion 990(f)'s requirement that a "successor in interest" to the "right
of publicity" must register with the Secretary of State and tender a
ten-dollar filing fee as a prerequisite to having any enforceable
rights.216 The model statute alternatively provides that the specified
persons would take ownership rights immediately without the bur-
densome technicalities of section 990(f). Although like distinctions
would inevitably occur between any statutes with regard to the "right
of publicity," it must be concluded that some specie of statutory
scheme, whether similar to this proposed model or not, is the only
viable solution to the inconsistency which seems to haunt the ques-
tion of a descendible "right of publicity."
V. CONCLUSION
The "right of publicity" has slowly evolved out of the right to pri-
vacy into an independent doctrine. The uncertainty which once
plagued the legal right has subsided, yet important inconsistencies
concerning a survivable and descendible right remain unsolved. The
inability of our judicial system to acknowledge the descendible "right
of publicity" ignores the very basis for which the right exists. Unlike
its parent, the right to privacy, the "right of publicity" is to protect
one from the unjust enrichment that results from the commercial ex-
ploitation of one's name, likeness, or persona. It is admitted that
one's right to privacy is a purely personal, nontransferable right that
214. See supra note 185.
215. See supra note 205 for the text of § 990(k).
216. See supra note 205 for the text of § 990(f).
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terminates upon one's death. However, the "right of publicity" in its
independence is a nonpersonal, assignable, property right which must
therefore survive and descend upon one's death.
Once an inheritable right has been acknowledged, one must then
consider limitations which include the exploitation requirement, du-
rational limits, and first amendment concerns. A, freely descendible
"right of publicity" should not be conditioned on an exploitation re-
quirement. A person who has sought privacy and avoided exploita-
tion in his lifetime should be entitled to the same protections,
perhaps to an even greater degree, that a person who has exploited
his name or likeness would enjoy. The descended right should exist
in the heirs until the last surviving child or surviving spouse has died.
Therefore, the natural objects of the decedent's bounty would be
served, and society will be enriched when the right terminates and
accedes to the public domain. The first amendment and a descendi-
ble "right of publicity" will always be at odds. They can co-exist,
however, at least until a free speech medium is used as a guise for
commercial exploitation.
The uncertainty surrounding the descendiblity of the "right of pub-
licity" cannot be eliminated by indecisive and inconsistent courts. A
freely survivable and inheritable right must be recognized, and legis-
lative action seems to be the only solution to the celebrity's plight.
TIMoTHY C. WILLIAMS
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